A riveting, two-part investigative
report by The Chicago Tribune, about the $100 billion a year, medical device
industry focuses on the annuloplasty ring, which is surgically inserted to
repair damaged heart valves.
The Tribune reports: "
If you have a faulty heart valve and decide to get it replaced, a surgeon will
implant an artificial one that has undergone rigorous examination by the Food
and Drug Administration. But if you choose the option recommended for most
patients — repairing your valve with an annuloplasty ring — there are no such
guarantees, even though both devices are permanently stitched into the heart
and considered life-sustaining.
"That's because, a decade ago,
the FDA downgraded the regulatory class of the rings. Instead of being grouped
with heart valves and implantable pacemakers, annuloplasty rings were put into
a class with most catheters, sutures and hearing aids, which allows the medical
device industry to gain approval for new rings without clinical studies."
FDA's lax approval process for
medical devices has shielded surgeons
and manufacturers who have made a killing from a lucrative business venture. FDA has even awarded the seal of approval years after the rings were
implanted in patients while still in the experimental stage--without their knowledge or
informed consent .
According to the Tribune analysis of
FDA data on adverse events, annuloplasty rings have had more deaths associated
with them during the past five years than any other device in their class.
Reporters, Jason Grotto and Deborah
Shelton, discovered that a single FDA official rubber stamped a petition by the
Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), which represents medical
device companies, allowing the invasive devices to make their way into the
hearts of thousands of patients with virtually no scrutiny.
In an interview with the Tribune, FDA officials said the agency thoroughly
vetted the 1997 petition in which AdvaMed argued that annuloplasty rings should
be switched into Class II. "Our expert team of engineers, statisticians and cardiac surgeons
approved the petition after considerable analysis," said Dr. Bram
Zuckerman, director of the agency's division of cardiovascular devices.
"We also did our own independent research and analysis and felt it was
appropriate to reclassify the device."
The disturbing findings of this investigative report--in particular, FDA's dereliction of duty and FDA officials' outright lies--should prompt Congressional hearings. FDA
officials are complicit in undermining public safety--thereby making a mockery of FDA's mission, as
reaffirmed in Congressional testimony by (then) FDA Commissioner, Andrew C. von
Eschenbach , M.D, May 1, 2007:
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
Heart-valve rings slip through FDA loophole
Permanently
implanted devices OK'd without clinical studies
May 22, 2011 By Jason Grotto and
Deborah L. Shelton
If you have a faulty heart valve and
decide to get it replaced, a surgeon will implant an artificial one that has
undergone rigorous examination by the Food and Drug Administration.
But if you choose the option
recommended for most patients — repairing your valve with an annuloplasty ring
— there are no such guarantees, even though both devices are permanently
stitched into the heart and considered life-sustaining.
That's because, a decade ago, the
FDA downgraded the regulatory class of the rings. Instead of being grouped with
heart valves and implantable pacemakers, annuloplasty rings were put into a
class with most catheters, sutures and hearing aids, which allows the medical
device industry to gain approval for new rings without clinical studies.
"It's absolutely ridiculous.
How could something that is permanently implanted in the heart be regulated
this way?" said Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Research Center
for Women & Families, a think tank that has fought for stricter oversight
of medical devices. "The first question is: Who petitioned this change and
what financial interest did they have?"
The answer, buried in federal records: the Advanced Medical
Technology Association, or AdvaMed, which represents medical device companies.
A Tribune investigation found that
the FDA rubber-stamped the group's petition, allowing the invasive devices to
make their way into the hearts of thousands of patients with virtually no
scrutiny.
Today, annuloplasty rings have had
more deaths associated with them during the past five years than any other
device in their class, according to a Tribune analysis of FDA data on adverse
events. Although there are many flaws in the way the FDA gathers its data and
there is no way to tell if the deaths are directly related to the rings'
performance, the analysis raises questions about whether the agency erred in
reclassifying the device.
The newspaper's findings come amid a
heated debate over the FDA's regulation of the $100 billion-a-year medical
device industry.
Despite reports of illnesses,
injuries and deaths linked to faulty hip and knee implants, defibrillators, and
other products, new devices continue to receive far less FDA scrutiny than new
drugs, and patients often are left in the dark about safety issues. The
Institute of Medicine is slated to release a study this summer about how
devices like the rings are cleared for use, and the FDA is expected to rewrite
some of its rules soon after.
Since annuloplasty rings were reclassified,
companies have introduced dozens of new models that fetch higher average prices
than older ones, without having to undergo the expense or time of clinical
trials. By contrast, pharmaceutical companies must fund extensive research
before new drugs are approved.
The regulatory change also paved the way for at least two models of the
heart rings to be implanted in more than 700 patients without clearance from
the agency. In fact, the FDA didn't even know the rings existed.
Edwards Lifesciences, the California-based company that manufactured the
devices, didn't submit them to the FDA for clearance, later arguing it didn't
have to because the rings were slight tweaks of products that already had been
cleared.
Yet the Tribune found that the company also filed patent applications for
one of the rings, listing dozens of ways in which it was different than
existing devices.
The agency ultimately decided that Edwards should have applied for clearance
before selling them. But it did nothing to punish the company, which has seen
its net income rise by 70 percent during the last three years to $218 million,
according to filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Edwards declined to comment on the newspaper's findings, saying through a
representative that the company "followed FDA's guidance" when it
sold the rings and resolved the issue "more than two years ago."
The rings are reclassified
When medical device laws were first put on the books in 1976, panels of
medical experts placed every device on the market into one of three classes.
Annuloplasty rings were in the highest-risk class, known as Class III, because
"the device is implanted and life sustaining."
The FDA was supposed to write regulations outlining what manufacturers must
do to gain premarket approval, or PMA, for each Class III device. In the
meantime, Class III devices on the market before the laws were enacted could be
sold through the less rigorous Class II process, known as 510k.
That had huge implications for manufacturers. Going through a PMA costs
hundreds of thousands of dollars and can take years, but the 510k process can
be completed in a few months and costs companies as little as a few thousand
dollars.
The FDA began writing PMA rules for
that group of devices in 1995. As part of the process, manufacturers could
petition the FDA to reclassify devices, which the agency had grouped with
devices that were "not likely candidates for reclassification."
In an interview with the Tribune, FDA officials said the agency thoroughly
vetted the 1997 petition in which AdvaMed argued that annuloplasty rings should
be switched into Class II.
"Our expert team of engineers, statisticians and cardiac surgeons
approved the petition after considerable analysis," said Dr. Bram
Zuckerman, director of the agency's division of cardiovascular devices.
"We also did our own independent research and analysis and felt it was
appropriate to reclassify the device."
Yet the Tribune found that the internal memo outlining the reasoning behind
the agency's decision lists a single reviewer: a hydrodynamics and acoustics
engineer. What's more, the memo — called a Reclassification Decision Making
Document — consists entirely of paragraphs and charts lifted directly from the
industry's petition.
The agency could not produce any material for the Tribune detailing any
independent review or analysis of the petition. Officials said it is rare for
them to issue a reclassification decision document that is taken word-for-word
from a petition but that they have done so "when the petition is
well-written."
The FDA and AdvaMed say the agency was justified in reclassifying
annuloplasty rings, regardless of how it happened. The petition cites numerous
studies finding that the rings are safe and effective and argues that medical
advances have mitigated the risks associated with implanting the devices.
But not one of the studies is a clinical trial involving patients from
multiple institutions randomly assigned into test groups. And many of the
authors are heart surgeons who invented medical devices for and receive
royalties from manufacturers.
In concluding its argument, the medical device industry wrote: "If
certain testing is made prerequisite to obtaining 510k clearance for
annuloplasty rings, FDA is able to maintain regulatory control over specific
aspects of the device. Thus, FDA is able to reasonably assure that the product
that is ultimately marketed is safe and effective."
That conclusion, verbatim, is included in the FDA's explanation of the
reclassification of annuloplasty rings, which the agency announced in 2001.
Yet, less than three years later, at least two rings began to be implanted
in the hearts of hundreds of people without the 510k clearance the agency said
was necessary to provide safe and effective medical devices to taxpayers.
Years after surgery, patient gets a letter
During annuloplasty ring surgery, patients' hearts are stopped and bypass
machines keep them alive while their chests are cut open and incisions are made
in their hearts to expose the tiny valves that the rings are then stitched
around.
The rings, made of metal and coated in rubber and cloth, are meant to fix
faulty mitral or tricuspid valves, which regulate blood flow to and from the
lungs.
If the valves don't work well, blood backs up into the chambers of the
heart, which can lead to shortness of breath and, eventually, heart failure.
The consensus among physicians is that repairing valves is preferable to
replacing them, in part because it allows patients to avoid taking blood
thinners for the rest of their lives.
The surgery was an ordeal Al Edwards, of Lincolnshire, dreaded. He had known
about his regurgitating mitral valve since he was a teenager and had no
symptoms. But the problem was getting worse as he grew older, and he had
developed an irregular heartbeat that required surgery. So Edwards decided to
have his valve repaired as well, hoping to avoid further surgery down the road.
Edwards, 61 at the time, chose to have the operation in February 2007 at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital in large part because of Dr. Patrick McCarthy, a
world-renowned heart surgeon there.
Two years after the surgery, Edwards received a letter from Northwestern's
CEO, Dean Harrison, addressing media reports that the ring inside Edwards, a
model called the Myxo ETlogix, "was experimental and not cleared by the
FDA for use." The reports, Harrison said, were wrong.
Unlike most patients, Edwards knew a thing or two about FDA regulations. He
has a doctorate in pharmacy and spent two decades working on drug approvals,
including three years with the FDA. He filed freedom of information requests
with the FDA and soon discovered that the agency hadn't cleared the device.
"I had to pick my jaw off the desk," he said. Although the ring he
received apparently fixed his mitral valve, the fact that the FDA hadn't
cleared the device — or even known that it existed — left him feeling betrayed.
It turns out the Myxo wasn't the only ring for which Edwards Lifesciences
failed to get clearance. A second ring, called the IMR ETlogix, had been on the
market since 2003 without the FDA's knowledge.
Under the law, annuloplasty rings and other devices in Class II can gain FDA
clearance if the manufacturer submits paperwork that declares the products are
"substantially equivalent" to existing, approved devices.
But to spare the agency a flood of paperwork, the FDA also allows new
devices to forgo the clearance process if they use the same labels, technology
and materials as products that already have been cleared.
Edwards Lifesciences decided that the Myxo and IMR rings fell into this
category, so it never sought clearance from the FDA.
Yet, at the same time, the company submitted a patent application to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for the Myxo — which McCarthy co-invented —
listing 40 characteristics that made the ring distinct from others on the
market.
"The present invention provides a novel annuloplasty ring for
correcting pathologies associated with mitral valve prolapse," the patent
reads.
According to the patent application, McCarthy's invention was an improvement
over other products because it would simplify the surgery needed to implant an
annuloplasty ring. Use of the ring would make the surgery available to more
patients, the application said.
The FDA says it does not review patent documents as part of its clearance
process.
The IMR, meanwhile, was the only ring on the market made specifically to
repair the mitral valves of patients who had experienced heart attacks.
In the end, the FDA found that Edwards Lifesciences erred when it failed to
seek clearance for the devices because the shapes and materials were different
than other rings on the market.
"They made changes to the devices that could impact the safety and
effectiveness and, as a result, Edwards should have (sought clearance),"
said Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, head of the FDA's medical device branch, who also said
that the agency is working on rules to clarify when manufacturers need to apply
for clearance.
The FDA cleared both the IMR and the Myxo, which had been rebranded as the
dETlogix, in April 2009 without any fines or even a warning letter. FDA
officials said at the time that Edwards Lifesciences, one of the largest heart
device companies in the world with a market capitalization of $6.7 billion, had
"made an honest attempt" to go through the proper channels but
misinterpreted the law.
A month afterward, Al Edwards received a second letter from Northwestern
saying his Myxo ring had been cleared by the agency — two years after his
surgery.
"It really boils down to your mother, your father, your son or
daughter, and whether you would want them to go through this," he said.
"My answer is no, I wouldn't. I would want an approved device."
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Patients at heart of medical device issue
Recipients
of life-saving products may not know of potential conflicts of interest when
doctors put their own inventions to use
May 22, 2011|By Deborah L. Shelton
and Jason Grotto, Tribune reporters
Nancy Stone, Chicago Tribune
Antonitsa Vlahoulis knew as she
slipped into unconsciousness on the operating room table that her surgeon would
choose which medical device she would receive to fix her leaky heart valve.
But when a warranty card arrived in
the mail for the device stitched into her heart, Vlahoulis got the first of
several shocks.
The card referred to the device by
its original name: the McCarthy Annuloplasty Ring. That's when she realized
that Dr. Patrick McCarthy, her surgeon at Northwestern Memorial Hospital, had
invented it.
Vlahoulis, of Niles, said McCarthy had told her he would choose a ring from
those listed in a booklet he gave her. She flipped through it, but this ring wasn't
there.
She checked the Food and Drug Administration's website, looking for the ring
on the agency's list of approved devices. But she couldn't find it. When she
contacted the FDA to ask about it, she received a startling email in reply.
"Due to our confidentiality concerns we are unable to provide any
information about a product until after it is approved," the public
affairs specialist wrote.
"Oh my God," Vlahoulis remembers thinking. "I can't believe
this."
Patients in need of permanently implantable, life-sustaining medical devices
may assume that the products have undergone rigorous clinical and regulatory
scrutiny and that rules put in place to protect their rights are enforced to
the letter of the law.
But that wasn't the case at Northwestern and other hospitals where two
different annuloplasty rings co-invented by McCarthy were sewn into the hearts
of more than 700 patients to treat their valve diseases over a number of years
though the FDA didn't clear the rings until 2009.
The situation highlights the tangled web of interests patients face when
they require medical devices not just at Northwestern but across the U.S.,
showing what can happen in a profitable industry with few controls and plenty
of gray areas.
It's especially true when doctors study their own inventions using data from
their patients, who don't always know of the potential conflicts of interest.
That's what happened at Northwestern, and it's a cautionary tale that
centers on two questions: Were the rings experimental? And was McCarthy
conducting clinical research on one of his inventions while receiving royalties
or other payments from the manufacturer?
McCarthy is a world-class heart surgeon who has saved thousands of lives,
improved the well-being of countless patients and made weighty contributions to
the art and science of cardiac surgery. His recruitment to Northwestern from
the Cleveland Clinic in 2004 was a coup, instantly making the hospital one of
the nation's premier cardiac centers.
In an interview, he said the rings' manufacturer had told him they were
cleared for use under FDA rules. The hospital received those same assurances, a
spokeswoman said.
In fact, the company — California-based Edwards Lifesciences — had not
submitted the rings to the agency for review. It would later argue,
incorrectly, that doing so was not necessary under FDA regulations.
McCarthy, who does about 150 valve surgeries a year, said that at the time
he had no knowledge of the rules governing medical devices and that he relies
on industry and the FDA to ensure the ones he uses are safe and effective.
"There are no guideposts for
us," he said. "You don't learn about this stuff in med school."
He also said he had stopped telling
patients some of the heart rings he uses were his inventions because most
didn't seem interested in such details.
The controversy over the device
Vlahoulis received triggered an FDA investigation that found Edwards should
have sought FDA clearance before allowing surgeons to use two of its
annuloplasty rings. But the agency took no action against the company, saying
it had "made a good faith effort" to follow the law, and soon allowed
the devices back on the market.
"Essentially, what happened here is that they bypassed
the federal regulatory system in its entirety," said Vera Hassner Sharav,
president of the Alliance for Human Research Protection, an education and
advocacy group. "The fact that FDA gives the rings a stamp of approval
after all of this only compounds the problems."
$100 billion industry
The case of the annuloplasty rings
also raises questions about the roles and responsibilities of doctors and
hospitals, who stand between patients and the $100 billion medical device
industry.
For patients with valve disease, the
stakes are high. To repair valves, their chests are opened, their hearts are
stopped and the life-sustaining device is stitched into the valve while a
heart-lung bypass machine keeps them alive.
Vlahoulis said she hunted for information about her ring because she had
complications following her April 2006 surgery. What she discovered did not set
her mind at ease.
She told her cardiologist, Dr. Nalini Rajamannan, that she had not consented
to receive an experimental, or "investigational," device or to be
part of a study about the ring.
As co-author with McCarthy on a study of the ring — renamed the Myxo ETlogix
— Rajamannan thought the device was experimental and that patients had given
consent to receive it.
She said she immediately paged McCarthy to tell him that patients didn't
know they had gotten an experimental device — or that they were part of his
research on the ring. She also contacted hospital and Northwestern University
officials, according to documents she provided to the Tribune. The university
oversees research at Northwestern that involves human subjects.
Rajamannan urged the hospital and university to investigate, but they told
her Edwards Lifesciences had assured them the ring did not need clearance
because it was a minor modification of an existing device.
"Neither Dr. McCarthy nor Northwestern Memorial Hospital has any
motivation to do anything other than what is in the best interest of its
patients, required to ensure patient safety and is required by the law,"
spokeswoman Holli Salls said last week.
With patients still getting the ring, an alarmed Rajamannan contacted the
FDA in July 2008.
After carrying out its investigation, the FDA told Edwards Lifesciences
officials that fall that the company should have sought FDA clearance because
the ring's shape and material made it different from other rings on the market.
The company voluntarily recalled the ring and applied for clearance.
Edwards Lifesciences officials declined to be interviewed but said in a
statement: "Edwards followed FDA's guidance relative to our (Myxo)
annuloplasty ring and Edwards addressed the requests from FDA and resolved them
more than two years ago."
In January 2009, Northwestern hospital's president and CEO, Dean Harrison,
sent a letter to Vlahoulis and other patients who had received the Myxo ring.
It stated that "we do not consider this device to be experimental."
The hospital said Harrison's information was based on an email received from
Edwards Lifesciences in August 2007, after the devices had been implanted,
saying the Myxo "is not an investigational device."
Yet according to the FDA, between
the time the Myxo ring first was being implanted and the time it was cleared,
about three years, it was an investigational device.
"If a device is supposed to get
cleared by the agency first before you're marketing it, we consider that
investigational," Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, head of the FDA's medical device
branch, told the Tribune.
The Myxo was cleared in April 2009
under yet another name, the dETlogix, along with another Edwards ring used at
Northwestern and other hospitals, the IMR ETlogix.
In May, Harrison wrote a second
letter to patients, saying the agency had cleared the ring. What patients
wouldn't know from reading his letter is that the FDA considered the device
investigational when many of them had it stitched into their hearts.
'Green-colored glasses'
In 2009, Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind.,
asked the FDA in a letter whether the agency had reviewed any data on the Myxo
ring before clearing it.
The agency pointed to a 2008 study
submitted by Edwards Lifesciences that compared the Myxo's performance with
that of another ring. The author? McCarthy. It was the same study he had been
working on with Rajamannan before she withdrew as co-author.
Arthur Caplan, director of the
Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, said such an
arrangement presents a conflict of interest for the physician doing the
research.
"You should never, ever be
studying what you own, what you have royalties from, what you have patents
on," Caplan said. "You need to have independent assessment because of
the obvious risk that you'll see things with green-colored glasses."
McCarthy receives royalties on his
inventions through the Cleveland Clinic, where he worked when he co-invented
the Myxo and the IMR, though he says he donates that money to the Greater
Chicago Food Depository.
McCarthy said he was not researching
the rings when he implanted them in patients. He was treating their valve
disease using his invention and then reviewing the outcomes.
"We were not conducting
research; we were treating patients," McCarthy said. "It was not part
of a research study. If from the start we had been told the ring was
investigational, we would have followed the clinical trial pathway."
Soon, medical device companies may
be required to disclose more information about payments they make to doctors.
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act was passed last year, and Congress, the FDA
and the industry are wrangling over how to implement it.
Some of McCarthy's patients also say they did not know data from their
surgeries would be used in a study comparing two annuloplasty rings. The need
for informed consent is one of the most important rules put in place to protect
the rights of patients and shield them from conflicts of interest in medicine
that could pose risks.
McCarthy said patients gave permission to use their data when they signed
forms agreeing to be included in a cardiac patient database. But Vlahoulis said
no one told her the information would be part of a study evaluating the ring.
In the wake of the Myxo controversy, Northwestern hospital said it now
informs patients in writing if doctors receive royalties for devices they
invent. The hospital also convened a medical device committee to confirm that
the FDA has cleared devices before they are used. However, the panel relies
solely on information received from manufacturers without checking with the
FDA.