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Since 1995 FDA scientists have been at odds against FDA
managers who routinely override sientists' safety concerns to approve dubious
prescription drugs.
EXAMPLES demonstrating a collision
between FDA safety officers and FDA leadership:
·
In 1995, Dr. Leo Lutwak, FDA’s Chief medical
reviewer of weight loss drugs , opposed approval of the diet drug,
Redux (FenPhen) citing numerous reports about serious adverse
effects—including, neuropsychiatric, pulmonary hypertension, and cardiac. The
lethal drug was approved, killing tens of thousands of people by damaging their
heart valves before it was withdrawn in 1997. Eventually the company (American
Home Products) agreed to settle 11,000 lawsuits for close to $5 billion. [1]
·
In 1996, Dr. John Gueriguian was stripped of his safety review
responsibilities after he raised concerns about potential liver damage and
heart toxicity linked to the diabetes drug, Rezulin. His expert
review of the Rezulin data was destroyed. In 1997, Glaxo-Welcome, European
distributor of Rezulin, withdrew the drug from the European market citing
deaths and liver damage in the US and Japan. FDA dragged its feet, issuing one
after another label changes. [2]
- In 1998, a survey of FDA scientists by Public Citizen revealed that FDA
approval standards had declined under pressure. The medical officers
identified 27 new drugs that had been approved within the previous 3 years
that they thought should not have been. [4]
- In November 2004, Dr. David Graham, emerged as the
most prominent FDA whistleblower whose riveting Congressional testimony
was front-page news. He characterized FDA’s handling of Vioxx
licensure as the worst preventable public health disaster in its history,
resulting in 88,000 to 139,000 heart attacks of which 30,000-55,000 were
fatal. He identified five other drugs with lethal risks whose use is
medically unjustifiable: the acne drug, Accutane, the anti-inflammatory
cox-2 inhibitor Bextra, the statin, Crestor, the diet drug, Meridia
(withdrawn 10/8/2010), and the asthma drug, Serevent. He stated that
“the FDA, as currently configured, is incapable of protecting America against
another Vioxx. We are virtually defenseless."[6]
Unfortunately, the broad
implications of Dr. Graham’s testimony have largely been ignored. Namely, the
tragic health consequences that result from licensing unsafe drugs stem from
the inherent conflict of interest that is a result of industry user fees. His
analogy to FDA’s irrational 95% certainty standard before it recognizes the
existence of a deadly drug hazard would be the equivalent to requiring that a
pistol with 100 bullet chambers must contain at least 95 bullets before it
could be said that the gun is loaded. [7]
He describes how FDA rigs the data
reviewing process to cover-up serious adverse drug effects:
“human clinical pharmacology trials
are typically done in Europe, yet clinical pharmacology reviewers at FDA have
been barred from analyzing this information prior to studies being conducted in
the US. Without being able to do this, we are unable to detect evidence of
risks early and cannot provide guidance that would help with the development of
the drug in terms not only of safety and proving efficacy, but also with the
efficiency and cost effectiveness of the drug's development. New labeling
policies can also mask risks as they exclude the labeling of adverse events if
they are under a certain percentage and/or not double the rate found with a
placebo. By this rule, certain serious and potentially lethal adverse events
that eventually resulted in a drug being withdrawn from the market would not
have had any mention of the adverse events made in the labeling at all. On top
of that, I frequently found companies submitting certain data to one place and
other data to another place and safety information elsewhere so it could not
all be pulled together and then coming in for a meeting to obtain an agreement
and proposing that the safety issue is negligible and does not need further
evaluation.”
“FDA's response to most expected
risks is to deny them and wait until there is irrefutable evidence
postmarketing, and then simply add a watered down warning in the labeling. In
fact, when patients exhibit drug toxicity, it is usually attributed to an
underlying condition which we know is likely to make the drug toxicity worse.
This also allows the toxicity to be dismissed as being unrelated to the drug in
any way.” [8]
In 2006, the Union of Concerned Scientists surveyed
5,918 FDA scientists about the scientific integrity at the FDA. Hundreds
of scientists reported having been pressured by management to approve a drug
despite scientific-based reservations about safety.
“Scientific discourse is strongly
discouraged when it may jeopardize an approval. . . . Whenever safety or
efficacy concerns are raised on scientific grounds . . . these concerns are not
taken seriously." [9]
A follow up survey conducted in 2011 found
that FDA scientists continue to complain about persistent interference by
special interests; they fear retribution for sharing concerns about the FDA;
they are uncertain about their right to publish controversial work in
peer-reviewed journals or to talk with the press. Substantial numbers of
respondents thought that FDA decisions were overly influenced by political
interests (55%) or business interests (40%). And over a third of the
respondents reported firsthand experience of interference in their work in the
past year.
The same year, the Institute of Medicine issued a devastating report documenting
significant interference with the FDA's scientific work, which
compromises the agency's ability to fulfill its mission of protecting public
health and safety. [10]
REFERENCES
1. FDA Doc Claims Fen-Phen Cover-Up,
CBS News, Feb. 11, 2009.
2. Willman, D. "Physician Who
Opposes Rezulin Is Threatened by FDA With Dismissal," The Los Angeles
Times, March 17, 2000. The report won Pulitzer Prize.
3. Ibid
4. Wolfe, S. Congressional Testimony
on FDA Deficiencies, Public Citizen, Feb. 27, 2008 http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=710
5. Waters, R. Lawmakers Open
Probe of FDA: Agency Accused of Barring Safety Data on Antidepressants, The
San Francisco Chronicle, March 31, 2004
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Lawmakers-open-probe-of-FDA-Agency-accused-of-2773090.php
6. Testimony of David J. Graham, MD,
MPH, Nov. 18, 2004, Senate Finance Committee Hearing http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111804dgtest.pdf
7. Ibid.
8. Rosenberg M. Former FDA Reviewer
Speaks Out About Intimidation, Retaliation and Marginalizing of Safety, TruthOut,
July 2012
9. Union of Concerned Scientists, Voices of Scientists at FDA: Protecting
Public Health Depends on Independent Science, 2006
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/fda-survey-brochure.pdf
and follow-up
10. Institute of Medicine, “The Future of Drug
Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public” 2006.
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2006/The-Future-of-Drug-Safety-Promoting-and-Protecting-the-Health-of-the-Public.aspx
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